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Introduction
Perhaps best epitomized by the "wanted" posters of nineteenth Century America, large cash rewards have commonly been used to solicit public assistance in the capture of dangerous fugitives.1 The legal concept of a fugitive reward as a contract is a relatively simple one, replete with the notions of offer, acceptance, and performance that are well rooted in contract law.2 Nevertheless, when the pursuit of a fugitive crosses international boundaries, such reward offers become subject to a more complicated legal framework.3 In a recent Eleventh Circuit case, Guevara v. Republic of Peru, the plaintiff sought to enforce a $5 million reward offer from the government of Peru after he assisted in the capture of Vladimiro Lenin Montesinos Torres (Montesinos).4 After a lengthy journey through the federal courts, the circuit court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).5 The FSIA provides immunity to foreign governments from lawsuits in U.S. courts while codifying certain enumerated exceptions to immunity.6 One such exception allows for suits against a foreign government that has engaged in "act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States."7 Although the court concluded in an earlier decision that Peru's reward offer qualified as a "commercial activity" under the FSIA, it held that the offer did not have a sufficiently "direct effect" in the United States to merit the immunity exception.8 The correct interpretation of this direct effect requirement, however, has puzzled district courts since the FSIA was signed into law in 1976.9 The context of the Guevara case illustrates the inconsistent applications and interpretations of the "commercial activity" exception by federal courts.10 In November 2010, the Supreme Court declined an opportunity to resolve this split amongst the circuits and denied the plaintiff's petition for certiorari.11
The application of the FSIA has extended beyond simple international business disputes and now includes criminal acts, as well as the pursuit of criminals.12 The Eleventh Circuit's apparent reversal of its 12 Compare Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 620 (1992) (holding that the commercial activity of government-issued bonds had a direct effect in the United States that waives FSIA immunity), with Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1302, 1310 (holding that a reward offered for the capture of a fugitive was a commercial activity, but did not have the required direct effect to waive FSIA immunity), and Adler v. Fed. Republic of Nigeria, 219 previous decision in Guevara illustrates the unpredictability of FSIA application and shows that a unilateral reward contract, performed in the United States, will not always be enforceable in U.S. courts.13 The conflicting decisions in Guevara have made apparent the need for courts to interpret the direct effect requirement as Congress intended and waive immunity when foreign governments act as marketplace participants in international commerce.14 By allowing the FSIA to prevent judicial guarantee of such unilateral contracts, a valuable tool of law enforcement may be significantly weakened and global security placed at risk. 15 Part I of this Note examines the factual and procedural background of the Guevara case. Part II discusses the legal framework of the FSIA and the law of contract that governs reward offers. It also examines current international fugitive rewards and security partnerships between the United States and foreign states. Part III applies the facts of Guevara to other FSIA interpretations and argues that foreign reward offers, accepted through performance in the United States, should be enforceable in U.S. courts.
I. Background
During the 1990s, Montesinos served as Peru's intelligence chief, as well as an advisor to former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori.16 Dubbed "Peru's Rasputin" because of his substantial influence over the President, Montesinos allegedly used his powerful post to commit a myriad of crimes including arms and drug trafficking, extortion and "more than a few murders."17 Although critics accused Montesinos of corruption for years, in September 2000, hundreds of videotapes surfaced that depicted him engaging in various criminal acts.18 During the public outcry that followed, President Fujimori disbanded the National F.3d 869, 875 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that an illegal contract can still qualify as a commercial activity, having a direct effect in the United States that waives FSIA immunity).
13 See Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1311 (Cox, J. dissenting) ("Most importantly, the Guevara I court explicitly decided that there was no immunity available to Peru under the FSIA.").
14 See Morrisey, supra note 9, at 703. Subsequent to this highly publicized arrest, both Peruvian and Venezuelan intelligence services claimed credit for its success; however, Peru also openly acknowledged the FBI's role in facilitating Montesinos' capture.31 Following his release, Guevara submitted his claim for the reward to Peru's Special High Level Committee (SLHC), the governmental committee authorized to dispense it.32 The SLHC, however, refused to pay him.33
After Peru refused payment, Guevara filed suit in Florida state court seeking enforcement of the reward offer.34 After removing the suit to federal district court, Peru moved for dismissal under the FSIA.35 The district court agreed, dismissing the case on the grounds that the reward offer did not qualify under any of the FSIA's exceptions.36 On appeal, however, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that Peru had "'ventured into the market place' to buy the information needed to get its man."37 On remand from the Eleventh Circuit, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Guevara, and entered a final judgment in the amount of $5 million plus interest.38 In Peru's appeal, the Eleventh Circuit revisited Peru's FSIA claim, although this time on different grounds.39
Although the circuit court originally decided that Peru's reward offer constituted a commercial activity, its first decision remained silent on the applicability of the remaining language of the FSIA.40 In the second appeal, the circuit court took up this inquiry and applied the three jurisdictional nexuses listed in § 1605(a)(2) to determine whether such commercial activity waived immunity.41 For waiver to occur, § 1605(a)(2) requires that the case be based upon (1) a commercial activity carried on within the United States, (2) acts performed in the United States in connection with commercial activity elsewhere, or (3) Applying the nexus analysis to Guevara, the circuit court concluded that under the first prong, the commercial activity of the reward offer did not take place within the United States.44 It reasoned that because the reward offer was created and administered by the SHLC in Peru, the commercial activity itself had not occurred in the United States.45 Analyzing the second prong of the nexus, the court held that Peru's telephone call to the FBI agents in Miami, in which Peru restated the availability of the reward, was not sufficiently "in connection with" the commercial activity of the reward offer.46 It held that if such a phone call could meet the "in connection with" requirement of the second nexus, then almost any statement made in the United States regarding the commercial transaction would waive immunity.47 Because such an interpretation would run counter to the principle that a foreign state may only waive immunity either explicitly or by implication, the circuit court declined to find that such a minor action met the requirements of the second prong. 48 In its analysis of the third and final prong, that acts performed in connection with the commercial activity have a direct effect in the United States, the court applied the holding of Harris Corp. v while in FBI custody satisfied the direct effect requirement.51 Moreover, the court rejected Guevara's contention that Peru's non-payment of the reward caused a direct effect in the United States, declining to allow a "negative activity" to establish a direct effect waiver of the FSIA.52 Finally, the court also held that Guevara's arrest in the United States was not a direct effect of Peru's reward offer, as the arrest was instead a consequence of his criminal behavior.53 The majority reversed the district court's summary judgment decision and remanded the case with the instruction that it be dismissed.54
In a dissenting opinion, however, Judge Cox criticized the court's holding that the issue of sovereign immunity was not addressed in the Eleventh Circuit's first decision.55 Judge Cox stated that when the Eleventh Circuit originally decided that Peru had engaged in a commercial activity, it also decided that the requisite "direct effect" nexus also existed.56 Additionally, he cited the court's previous holding that the individual defendants named in the suits were not entitled to sovereign immunity, "'because the sovereign itself is not.'"57 Although critical of the Eleventh Circuit's apparent reversal of its own decision, Judge Cox also stated that rather than apply the FSIA, the court should have dismissed the suit under principles of international comity.58 Under that doctrine, he felt that the court should have recognized and respected the decision of the SHLC to not pay the reward as the final determination of the matter.59
Following the Eleventh Circuit's dismissal of the claim, Guevara petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari.60 The petition asserted that the circuits are evenly split as to the correct application of the FSIA direct effect analysis. vember 26, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari.64
II. Discussion

A. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity is an ancient legal concept originally intended to protect foreign officials who conduct business abroad. 65 The Supreme Court first established the doctrine of sovereign immunity in landmark case of Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon.66 In that case, Chief Justice Marshall held that no U.S. jurisdiction exists over a foreign sovereign absent the sovereign's express consent. 67 The dicta of that opinion, however, suggested that immunity may be waived if the foreign sovereign acts as a private party. 68 Many later courts applied the holding broadly and interpreted the decision "as extending virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereigns as 'a matter of grace and comity.'"69
Following Schooner Exchange, the courts developed a two-step system for making sovereign immunity determinations.70 Under this system, a diplomatic representative from the foreign state could petition for a "suggestion of immunity" from the State Department, and upon such a suggestion the court would surrender jurisdiction.71 In the absence of a State Department request, the district courts could also make such an immunity determination themselves.72 As foreign states began to engage increasingly with private parties in international business, however, it became clear that the absolute application of immunity was no longer desirable.73
In 1952, the State Department halted its general practice of requesting sovereign immunity for all friendly sovereigns.74 That year, Jack Tate, the acting legal advisor to the State Department, announced that the department would adopt a "restrictive" theory of sovereign immunity. 75 The restrictive theory of immunity, which many other countries had already adopted by the 1950s, recognized the role of the foreign state in international commerce and stripped immunity from suits where a foreign government acted in a commercial capacity. 76 In recognizing the importance of the restrictive theory, Tate found that individuals engaged in business with foreign states needed the protection of a judicial remedy and therefore sovereign immunity must be waived in such instances. 77 In 1976, Congress sought to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity by enacting the FSIA. 78 The FSIA has been described as a "statutory labyrinth" with "numerous interpretative questions engendered by its bizarre structure and its many deliberately vague provisions."79 Although the FSIA operates under the traditional premise that foreign governments are immune from U.S. jurisdiction, it codifies specific exceptions, most significantly the commercial activity exception inherent in the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 80 The FSIA defines commercial activity as "either a regular course of commercial activity or a particular commercial transaction or act."81 In Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., the Supreme Court held that "when a foreign government acts, not as regulator of a market, but in the manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign's actions are 'commercial' within the meaning of the FSIA."82 This interpretation has been extended to include acts seemingly sovereign in nature, such as the national registration of aircraft, if a foreign state contracts with a private company for assistance in such governmental functions. 83 The federal courts have even extended the definition of commercial activity to include illegal conduct.84 This interpretation stemmed from Justice White's concurrence in Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, in which he posited that torture of a plaintiff by government hired thugs, rather than police, could be considered a commercial activity.85 Not all circuits have been willing to follow such a broad interpretation of commercial activity, however, leaving the precise definition of the term uncertain.86
Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA establishes the commercial activity exception and provides three nexuses for waiver of immunity due to commercial activity.87 First, immunity is waived when "the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the foreign state."88 Second, waiver applies when the suit is based "upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere."89 Finally, waiver occurs when a suit is based "upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States."90 Although the first and second nexuses do not explicitly define the commercial activity or "in connection with" requirements, it is the interpretation of the third nexus's direct effect requirement that poses significant difficulty for the circuit courts.91
Almost immediately after the enactment of the FSIA, the circuit courts developed different interpretations of the direct effect clause.92 Although most circuits required that a direct effect in the United States be "substantial and foreseeable," others expressly rejected such a requirement. Tenth Circuits still employ the legally significant act requirement in their direct effect inquiry.108
B. Unilateral Reward Contracts
When some aspect of a contract for the purchase of goods or services occurs in the United States, and a foreign state is a party, it will likely meet the requirements for the waiver of immunity.109 Under modern contract law, a party can be legally bound by an offer, even absent any formal bargaining with another party.110 Such open offers are called unilateral contracts, and they represent an enforceable promise of consideration upon the performance of a requested act.111 Open reward and prize offers, whether for information leading to the arrest of a fugitive or for a successful hole in one in a golf tournament, are considered unilateral contracts.112 Unilateral contracts, and fugitive rewards in particular, can only be accepted through complete performance of the offer's specific terms, and the offeror may also revoke the offer any time before performance is complete. 113 The law governing rewards for assistance in the capture or arrest of wanted fugitives has developed over the centuries in U.S. courts.114 Shuey v. United States involved a $25,000 reward offer for the arrest of John H. Suratt, an alleged conspirator in the assassination of Abraham Lincoln.115 Although President Andrew Johnson publicly revoked the reward offer, that revocation was unbeknownst to Henri Beaumont de Sainte Marie, an associate of Suratt's.116 When Sainte Marie discovered Suratt hiding in Vatican City, he alerted the authorities and even ac-companied the U.S. Navy as it finally apprehended Suratt following his escape to Egypt.117 When Sainte Marie petitioned Ulysses S. Grant, the interim Secretary of War, for the $25,000 reward, he was denied on the grounds that the reward offer had been previously revoked.118 In the litigation that followed, Sainte Marie's claim for the reward reached the Supreme Court.119 The Court held that regardless of a party's reliance on such a reward offer, the offeror could validly revoke it any time before performance, even without the offeree's knowledge of such revocation.120
Some courts have come to understand the Supreme Court's opinion in Shuey as requiring the strict interpretation of the terms of a reward offer.121 Under this view, if a reward is offered for the "arrest" of a fugitive, simply providing information leading to the arrest of that fugitive does not satisfy the requested performance of the offer.122 Other courts have been more willing to interpret reward offers liberally, holding that providing information leading to an arrest is essentially the same as performing the act of arrest itself.123
Another unsettled area of the law governing reward offers is whether knowledge of the offer, prior to performance, is essential to recovery.124 Although some courts have ruled that knowledge of a reward is essential to the formation of a unilateral contract, not every court has adhered to this principle. must prove knowledge of a reward offered by a government to prove the existence of a binding contract.128 Some courts have also acknowledged a possible distinction between governmental and private reward offers, with knowledge of such a reward only being required in the latter instance.129
The law governing fugitive reward offers also draws a distinction between rewards offered through a proclamation and those offered pursuant to a government official's statutory authorization.130 When a government offers a reward pursuant to a statute, the offer is subject to the terms of the statute rather than contract law.131 When a government official has the authority to make reward offers independently, however, that authority equates to the power to enter the government into a binding contract.132 In Cornejo-Ortega v. United States, the Court of Federal Claims dismissed the claim of an individual who provided the whereabouts of a fugitive in Mexico who was wanted for kidnapping, robbery and the murder of a DEA agent.133 Although federal agents showed the plaintiff a reward poster with the fugitive's name and picture, offering a "reward up to $2,200,000," the court held that no valid unilateral contract existed because the agents did not have the authority to enter the federal government into such a contract.134 Furthermore, the court found that the language used in the poster, which included the words "up to," provided no guarantee of any payment, since such phrasing may be interpreted "to include zero as its lower limit."135
Rewards offered by private individuals are subject to the same concepts of contract law that apply to rewards offered by governments or their agencies.136 In Norman v. Loomis Fargo & Co., the Western District of North Carolina held that when an armored car company publicized a $500,000 reward for information "that result [ed] in the capture of the perpetrators" of the theft of several million dollars, it created a uni- ment in combating the drug violence plaguing the border areas.154 The stated purpose of the Mérida Initiative is to disrupt organized crime syndicates that operate between both countries, as well as strengthen the communities and institutions needed to improve security.155 In addition to funding the Partnership, the United States also currently offers multi-million dollar rewards for information leading to the arrest of top cartel leaders.156
The United States also assists in security and anti-terrorist partnerships well beyond its North American borders. 157 In order to combat the various security threats operating in the Philippines, such as the Al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the United States has provided non-combat military support to the region.158 American advisors have also assisted in the training and development of the Philippine National Police.159 After the kidnapping of two American missionaries by ASG operatives, the U.S. Department of Justice offered rewards of up to $5 million for information leading to arrest or conviction of the members of the organization. 
A. FSIA Immunity Should Not Allow the Contractual Obligations of Foreign States to Be Avoided
While the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Guevara on the grounds of FSIA immunity, according to the facts of the case the plaintiff still met all of the requirements for a binding unilateral contract under U.S. contract law.164 Unlike the federal agents in Cornejo-Ortega, the President of Peru was acting within the scope of his authority when he issued the decree establishing the reward.165 Guevara, having learned of the reward while in F.B.I. custody, provided this information as a direct result of Peru's promise of compensation.166 Finally, as the district court acknowledged in its summary judgment, Guevara's information directly resulted in Montesinos' capture, thereby fulfilling the requested performance of the Emergency Decree.167 Because Guevara had met all of the requirements for formation of a binding unilateral contract, in the absence of FSIA immunity the reward offer would have been enforceable under American law. 168
The willingness of U.S. courts to liberally interpret reward offers and enforce obligations to pay such rewards illustrates the need for judicial protection of such agreements.169 The important policy considerations behind maintaining the integrity of a unilateral contract make it precisely the type of claim the commercial activity exception is supposed to make available against foreign states.170 The FSIA was intended to maintain the enforceability of contracts between private parties and foreign states by providing a remedy in U.S. courts in the event of a breach. providing information to law enforcement, the legally binding promise of compensation must be vigorously protected by courts, even against foreign states.172 When a foreign state enters the market as a private party, it must be made subject to the same obligations of private individuals after the formation a contract.173 In Guevara, the Emergency Decree was silent on jurisdiction and did not specify any forum for disputes arising from the offer.174 Because of its role as the offeror, Peru was free to include an arbitration or forum selection clause if it wished to be free from the possibility of adjudication or enforcement of the offer in the U.S. courts.175 Allowing a state to claim FSIA immunity, after it has failed to address jurisdictional concerns in its contract, goes beyond the defenses afforded to a private party and therefore runs counter to the purpose of the commercial activity exception.176
B. Application of the FSIA Commercial Activity Exception to Reward Offers
While the Eleventh Circuit found that the first two nexuses of the commercial activity exception did not apply to the reward offer in Guevara, that may not be true for every reward offered by a foreign state. 177 The first nexus, which waives immunity when a foreign state partakes in a commercial activity in the United States, could potentially be satisfied in the context of a fugitive reward offer.178 In Guevara, the Eleventh Circuit held that because the Special High Level Committee which oversaw the offer was based in Peru, and the $5 million of reward money lay in a Peruvian escrow account, no part of the commercial activity was carried on in the United States.179 Under this holding, if Peru had sent its own law enforcement agents to Miami to evaluate Guevara's information or had arranged for payment of the reward through a U.S.
bank account, such commercial activity might be considered as having occurred in the United States, satisfying the first jurisdictional nexus.180 Also, while the court found that publishing the reward through an official Peruvian website maintained the sovereign nature of the offer outside the United States, active promotion of a reward in a U.S. based publication or media outlet may also meet the requirements for waiver of immunity under the first nexus.181
While the offer in Guevara failed to meet the requirements of the second nexus, which waives immunity in suits based upon an act in the United States "in connection with a commercial activity elsewhere," under different circumstances a foreign state's actions might meet this requirement.182 Reluctant to expand the scope of the second nexus, the Eleventh Circuit was unwilling to find that the single phone call by a Peruvian official to the FBI in Miami was sufficiently "in connection with" the commercial activity of the reward offer.183 In doing so, the court noted that to allow for such a discrete act to constitute waiver of sovereign immunity would violate the principle that immunity may only be waived either by explicit or implicit waiver.184 Although the court failed to articulate what types of acts would establish a proper waiver, it appears that greater communication between Peruvian and U.S. authorities, or greater direct contact with an informant in the United States, might be adequately "in connection with" the commercial activity.185
In a situation like Guevara, where most of the reward-related activity occurs within the offering country, the third nexus's direct effect inquiry represents the most appropriate test for a FSIA determination.186 Just as the Peruvian government independently administered and managed the Montesinos reward offer within their borders, so to do other countries seeking information on a wanted fugitive.187 For instance, the proposed "Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorism Program" in the Philippines would grant the Philippine Depart- 187 Compare Guevara II, 608 F.3d at 1300 (stating that Peru's reward offer was administered by the subcommittee of Ministry of the Interior), with Phil. Pending Act Establishing a Rewards Program, supra note 162 (proposing the establishment of a reward program under the supervision of the Philippine Department of Justice), and Vasovic, supra note 144 (stating that Serbia's reward offer for an accused war criminal is funded through specially allocated government funds). ment of Justice the discretion to authorize and administer rewards in a fashion similar to Peru's SHLC.188 Similarly, the Serbian government allocated the €10 million reward for accused war criminal Ratko Mladic in much the same way Peru placed its reward funds in escrow.189 Because the locus of the commercial activity, and any acts in connection with it, remain within the offering country in these instances, the direct effect nexus is the most applicable FSIA analysis for such reward offers. 190 When a reward offer is subject to the direct effect analysis, it should also be subject to the various tests the courts use when applying the third nexus to other forms of contracts.191 In Weltover, the Supreme Court interpreted a direct effect as one that follows "as an immediate consequence of the defendant's . . . activity."192 The Court held that waiver of FSIA immunity occurred when the Argentinean government's failure to pay out its bonds in New York City had a direct effect in the United States.193 While a reward offer is unlike the bond agreement at issue in Weltover, it still becomes a binding contract once the informant provides the information and the requested performance is completed. 194 Although a reward logically occurs as a direct result of the offer's existence, an informant provides information to the authorities as an immediate consequence of the offer. 195 Although the Eleventh Circuit failed to directly apply this test in Guevara, because a person provides the requested information as an immediate consequence of the promised compensation, acceptance of a reward offer should meet the requirements of a direct effect under Weltover.196 Rather than solely applying the language of the Weltover holding to Guevara, the Eleventh Circuit instead relied on the Second Circuit's interpretation of the test.197 In Harris Co. v. National Iranian Radio & Television, the Second Circuit interpreted Weltover as requiring that that a direct effect be "sufficiently" in the United States, as well as have "significant, foreseeable financial consequences [in the United States]. "198 In applying this interpretation to Guevara, the Eleventh Circuit found the plaintiff's only "acceptance-related activity" was a single phone call between U.S. and Peruvian authorities to which Guevara was not a party.199 This analysis of Guevara's acceptance, however, does not consider the basic nature of a unilateral contract. 200 The Eleventh Circuit failed to recognize that under the law of unilateral contract, when Guevara provided the information to the FBI and completed performance of the requested task, he accepted the offer.201 When the circuit court applied Harris's financial consequence requirement, it also failed to consider the use of FBI resources for the capture of Montesinos as a "significant, foreseeable financial consequence" of the reward offer.202 Because Peru's reward offer resulted in the coordinated actions of several FBI agents over multiple days, the use of those agents likely represented a significant financial burden to the U.S. government. 203 Although the Supreme Court in Weltover expressly renounced the addition of "unexpressed requirements" to the direct effect clause, some circuits apply additional tests, such as the legally significant act and the substantial and foreseeable tests.204 Although these tests are intended to clarify and narrow the scope of the commercial activity exception, the Eleventh Circuit failed to apply them in Guevara, ignoring many of the other circuits' means of FSIA analysis. 205 The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its use of a "substantial and foreseeable" requirement in America West Airlines v. GPA Group, where a U.S. based purchaser of aircraft sued the national airline of Ireland for damages sustained from the faulty service of a jet engine. 206 Because the repairs only occurred in Ireland at the direction of one of the contracting parties, the court found that U.S. contacts to the Irish government were "purely fortuitous" and were not substantial or foreseeable enough to create a direct effect.207 That decision relied heavily on the fact that the Irish entity servicing the engine was unaware that the aircraft would be used in the United States.208 In Guevara, however, the Peruvian government was in contact with the FBI during its pursuit of Montesinos and knew it was dealing with an informant in FBI custody in Miami.209 Any time a foreign state knowingly forms a contract for information with a party located in the United States, and also coordinates apprehension efforts with U.S. authorities, there can be no claim that the U.S. connection was purely fortuitous.210
The application of the legally significant act test arose as a result of the apparent vagueness of Weltover's immediate consequence test. 211 The Supreme Court seemingly affirmed its use when it followed the Second Circuit's decision in Weltover to "'look to the place where legally significant acts giving rise to the claim occurred.'"212 Because some circuits feared that a liberal interpretation of the direct effect requirement might turn U.S. courts into "international court[s] of claims", the legally significant act test provides a much narrower standard for waiver of immunity.213 Under this standard, U.S. courts are able to enforce the contractual obligations of foreign states, while still requiring more than a tenuous connection to the United States to establish waiver of immunity. 214 Pursuant to its holding in United World Trade v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Ass'n., the Tenth Circuit still employs the legally significant act requirement in its direct effect analysis. 215 In that case, the circuit court found that a breach of contract had no direct effect in the United States because "no part of the contract . . . was to be performed in the mant.225 Such purposeful availment of U.S. resources goes far beyond any "'random,' 'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts" with the United States. 226 While courts have applied various tests and interpretations to the commercial activity exception of the FSIA, the core purpose of the provision remains the same: if a foreign sovereign participates in private commercial activity, it should not be granted foreign sovereign immunity. 227 The purchase of information, whether it is the location of a dangerous fugitive or a consumer's credit report, remains a commercial exchange that occurs among private parties on a daily basis.228 Just as the private company in Loomis Fargo Co. entered a contract with a private party for information regarding a robbery, so too did Peru engage with a private individual to locate the country's most notorious fugitive.229 Although courts apply numerous interpretations and tests to the direct effect clause of the FSIA, all are intended to ensure that waiver of immunity occurs only when a foreign sovereign performs a commercial activity that affects the United States.230 Rather than simplify the already confusing doctrine, the final Guevara decision only further complicates the FSIA analysis by recognizing that Peru engaged in a commercial activity with a party in the United States, yet still failed to meet the requirements for waiver of immunity.231
C. The Inapplicability of the International Comity Doctrine to Reward Offers
In his dissenting opinion in Guevara, Judge Cox recognized that the requirements of the commercial activity exception should have waived FSIA immunity, but also suggested that the claim should be dismissed based on the "doctrine of international comity."232 In Hilton v. Guyot, the Supreme Court defined international comity as "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."233 Judge Cox stated that the Peruvian Government's decision to withhold the reward from Guevara should be respected on the grounds of international comity and not be questioned through litigation in the United States. 234 The use of the comity doctrine to abstain from hearing a case is based on the principle that a judgment issued by a foreign nation should be recognized in U.S. courts.235 In Guevara, however, Peru's decision to withhold the reward came only through the Department of the Interior's SHLC, without any adjudication by a Peruvian court. 236 The abstention doctrine generally is applied only when a judgment has been rendered by a competent foreign court employing principles of civilized jurisprudence.237 Invocation of the international comity doctrine is improper in cases such as Guevara, where a plaintiff seeks to enforce a contract with a foreign state and there has not been a parallel judicial proceeding in that state. 238 Courts also invoke the international comity doctrine out of concern that litigation would strain the "amicable working relationships" between the United States and a foreign sovereign.239 In the case of Guevara, concern over damaging relations with Peru is unwarranted given the amount of support the United States already provides in pursuing Peru's most dangerous fugitives. 240 The State Department currently offers rewards of up to $5 million, an amount identical to Peru's offer for Montesinos, for information leading to the arrest of two members of the "Shining Path," a Peruvian terrorist group.241 Because the United States remains a leading provider of large cash rewards for information regarding the world's most dangerous criminals, enforcement of another state's reward offer would not strain the strong working relationships already in place between the United States and its partners in global security.242
D. The Harm Resulting from Failing to Enforce Foreign Reward Offers
At the most basic level, failure to find waiver of FSIA immunity in a reward offer would permit a foreign state to bargain for information but not pay for it, allowing for unjust enrichment.243 In Guevara, Peru entered the market like any private party and sought to purchase information on Montesinos' whereabouts through a unilateral contract.244 Failure to enforce a foreign state's obligation to pay such a reward allows that state to "shift to the [plaintiff] its ordinary marketplace obligations for the . . . services that plaintiff . . . furnish [ed] ."245 Just as the Supreme Court found that the FSIA direct effect clause protected the contractual interests of Swiss and Panamanian bondholders, so too should individuals, who undertake tremendous personal risk and assist in the capture of dangerous fugitives, have their contractual interests protected.246 Failure to do so would simply allow a foreign government to contract for and receive a valuable service like any private party but leave it with no legal obligation to pay for it. 247 The United States adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in part because it was no longer claiming immunity in contract or tort claims in foreign courts, and it was therefore unfair to allow other foreign states to do so.248 This concept of reciprocity should also apply to the commercial activity of fugitive reward offers. 249 Since its inception, the Rewards for Justice Program has paid over $100 million to sixty informants for information they provided to assist in the cap-ture the world's most wanted criminals. 250 The intelligence procured by these substantial reward offers has resulted in the capture of actors posing serious threats to both U.S. and international security, such as Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, and Edgar Navarro, the commander of the FARC rebels in Columbia. 251 In most of these cases the informants were located outside the United States and the Department of Justice readily delivered on its promise to provide millions of dollars to foreign nationals for their service. 252 To allow a foreign state to avoid payment of its obligations, while the United States honors its own, violates the FSIA's underlying principles of reciprocity.253 While reward offers may be a unique form of contract, allowing a state to renege on a reward payment obligation "would jeopardize not only its vital interests but those of every country that offers rewards for information, including [the United States]. "254 In addition to the fundamental unfairness of allowing an offering state to violate contract law while the United States meets the same obligations abroad, failure to provide legal protection to informants could have adverse effects on U.S. law enforcement.255 Paid informants are a crucial tool used to infiltrate major criminal operations, and such reward offers provide the motivation for key witnesses to come forward. 256 In a situation like Guevara's, where a federal law enforcement agency deals directly with an informant, it is of paramount importance that the informant retain a level of trust in the government agency to ensure that further information will be provided. 257 The existing partnerships between the United States and Mexico, Canada, and the Philippines create an opportunity for informants to come forward to U.S. authorities with information on serious criminal activity, in a situation similar to that in Guevara.258 Because informants are quite often involved in illegal activity themselves, it seems quite likely that a suspect in U.S. custody could have valuable information regarding criminal activity abroad.259 Under the collaborative police efforts currently in place, U.S law enforcement is also likely to rely on foreign reward offers as a tool in soliciting information, just as the FBI did in Guevara.260 If an informant in the United States was motivated to come forward to federal authorities because of a foreign state's lucrative reward offer and the offering state refused payment, the credibility of federal law enforcement among informants would be severely compromised.261 Because "the promise of a reward means little or nothing to an informant if the country offering the reward cannot be made to pay it," continued participation of informants in our collaborative law enforcement operations requires that such rewards must be made enforceable in U.S. courts.262 Given the vital role that informants play in the criminal justice system, especially those who provide information crucial to both U.S. and international security-the FSIA must be interpreted in a way that protects their interests.263
Conclusion
The Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Guevara both muddied the waters of FSIA jurisprudence and undermined a valuable tool employed by law enforcement all over the world. Congress intended the FSIA to provide U.S. jurisdiction when a foreign state breaches its obligations in a commercial contract. Reward offers are a recognized form of contract that simply equates to the purchase of information through the promise of compensation. When a foreign state offers rewards for information regarding a wanted fugitive, an informant in the United States creates a binding contract when he or she provides that information. The creation of such a contract, especially when it is formed through the assistance of U.S. authorities, undoubtedly has the requisite direct effect on the United States to waive sovereign immunity. It is imperative that these contracts, when performed in the United States, receive the protection of U.S. courts as the FSIA intended. As a partner in global security, the United States must be able to rely on reward offers from other countries when it solicits information regarding dangerous international fugitives. Because rewards are only as effective as 
